

Name: _____ Instructor: _____

Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Nations, States, and Nation-States

► ACTIVITY 1: THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA

Activity 1 requires you to read six selections about the former Yugoslavia and then answer questions about them. The first article (Goodrich, 1993) is from *The Christian Science Monitor*. It is one of several articles we have selected from the *Monitor* because of its world-famous coverage of international affairs—not because of its religious affiliation. The Goodrich article provides a 1,500-year historical overview that is not usually available in newspapers. We have added a few key points to this article [in square brackets], and some useful maps (Figures 13.6–13.8, Table 13.1).

The second reading consists of excerpts from a United Nations research article by Ali Karaosmanoglu (1993) that offers a concise summary of how and why the former Yugoslavia fell apart. It highlights the most important fact about the political geography of the area: that the former Yugoslavia was a multinational state, but breaking it into its individual republics (i.e., provinces) did not solve the problem because both Bosnia and Croatia were also each a mix of nations.

In the third article, photojournalist Lee Malis of *The Christian Science Monitor* tells the harrowing tale of one young Muslim woman's nightmare at the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. We warn you of the graphic nature of this short feature article; you could find it disturbing. It should be emphasized that the Serbs were not the only nation to engage in such war crimes.

Why not carve Bosnia up into three states, and let the Serbian part of Bosnia join with Serbia and the Croatian part of Bosnia join with Croatia? Why does the rest of the world care about keeping Bosnia in one piece? This is the subject of the fourth reading, a short analysis by Laura Kay Rozen from *The Christian Science Monitor* in September 1996, at the time of the first-ever Bosnian elections. Five key points summarize why keeping Bosnia whole was important to the foreign policies of other countries. Note that neither we (the textbook authors) nor the article author herself necessarily espouse all of these arguments. In fact, one of the points regarding a fear of Islamic terrorism from a Muslim-dominated Bosnian state is an example of prejudicial thinking. However, all five arguments frequently were heard on talk shows and seen on op-ed pages of the time.

The final reading consists of excerpts from two U.S. Department of State reports on the Kosovo (pronounced Koh-SOH-vah) crisis. The stated purpose of these reports was to document the extent of ethnic cleansing by the Serbs against the Albanians in Kosovo. Aerial photography and other forms of evidence accompanied these reports, which were delivered to the Executive Branch of the U.S. government and Congress, U.S. allies, and the international community. They were important documents in the decisions to use U.S. military power to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to justify the deployment of U.S. troops as peacekeepers. The reports were also made available to the media and the public over the Internet. In reading these excerpts, you should think about some of the geopolitical issues that could explain why the United States chose to intervene in this particular crisis but not in

others. The Serbs have historically been allies with the Russians, who are also Slavs who follow an Eastern Orthodox form of Christianity. Other issues to consider are the U.S.'s historic alliance with Western Europeans, the importance of not appearing to be anti-Islamic, and the power of media images of mass graves, burning houses, and refugees.

It would take many newspaper articles to fill you in on all that happened in the aftermaths of the Bosnia and Kosovo crises. We wrap it up for you with a short summary and map that updates you to early 2006.

► ACTIVITY 1 READINGS

- Goodrich, Lawrence J. 1993. Old Animosities, Exploited Today, Underlie Complex Balkans Puzzle. *The Christian Science Monitor* (Oct. 13, 1993):1–2.
- Karaosmanoğlu, Ali L. 1993. *Crisis in the Balkans*. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Research Paper no. 22, UNIDIR/93/37. New York: United Nations.
- Malis, Lee. 1993. Bosnia: The Flight from Ethnic Cleansing. *The Christian Science Monitor* (Feb. 17, 1993):9–11.
- Rozen, Laura Kay. 1996. Keeping Bosnia Whole: Why the World Cares. *The Christian Science Monitor* (Sept. 19, 1996):5.
- U.S. Department of State. 1999. *Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo*: www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnic_ksvo_toc.html (May 1999).
- U.S. Department of State. 1999. *Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting*: www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/kosovoii/homepage.html (Dec. 1999).

► QUESTIONS

(Note: Answers to questions marked by * cannot be obtained directly in the readings. You'll need to think critically about the readings and apply concepts properly to figure them out.)

A. History of Hatred

Refer to articles by Goodrich and Karaosmanoğlu and Figures 13.6 and 13.9.

1.1. What cultural trait, language or religion, divides the Serbs and Croats?

1.2. Name the religion of the Serbs _____ and of the Croats. _____

1.3. What historical development is responsible for this religious divide between Serbs and Croats? _____

1.4. How did Muslims come to this region of Europe?

1.5. In what century did the Muslims defeat Serbia in the battle of Kosovo?

1.6. What other outside empire next dominated the northern parts of the region in the several centuries prior to World War I? _____

1.7. A country called Yugoslavia (Land of the Southern Slavs) first came into being after World War I. Which of its member nations dominated Yugoslavia at that time?

1.8. What happened during World War II that further increased Serb-Croat hatred and added to the Serb sense of victimhood?

B. The Pre-Breakup Situation

Refer to articles by Goodrich and Karaosmanoğlu, Figures 13.7 and 13.8, and Table 13.1.

After World War II, Yugoslavia adopted a federal system of government. The country was divided into six “republics,” similar to the 50 U.S. states and 13 Canadian provinces, but with one important difference. In Yugoslavia, the government tried to define the republics along ethnonational lines.

1.9. Which republic was most ethnically uniform?*

1.10. Which republic was least ethnically uniform?*

1.11. Prior to its breakup, was Yugoslavia a nation-state, a multistate nation, or a multination state?*

1.12. The prewar state of Yugoslavia referred to its component regions as “republics.” Would a political geographer have called them states, nations, or provinces?*

1.13. From World War II until its breakup, Yugoslavia had what kind of government—communist, capitalist, or monarchy?

C. The Breakup

Refer to article by Karaosmanoğlu, Figures 13.7 and 13.8, and Table 13.1.

From 1991 to 1993, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia all claimed independent status. In fact, the breakup of Yugoslavia consisted of three wars, not one.

1.14. Did Yugoslavia break up because of ethnonationalism or irredentism?*

1.15. The first war, which lasted only ten days, was between Slovenia and the Yugoslavian government after Slovenia declared its independence in the spring of 1991. Would the declaration of independence by Slovenia be described as an act of irredentism or secession?*

1.16. Why didn't the Serb-dominated government of Yugoslavia put up more of a fight to keep Slovenia from breaking away?*

1.17. After Slovenia became independent, could it have been characterized as a nation-state (see Figure 13.8)?* _____

1.18. The second war also started in the spring of 1991, but in Croatia. The two warring nations were _____ and _____.

D. Bosnia

Use article by Rozen, Table 13.1, and Figures 13.7, 13.8, and 13.12.

To answer the next set of questions, you need to adjust your mental map. After breaking up, the former Yugoslavia consisted of five states, not one. In addition to Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia, the remaining two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, stayed together under the name of Yugoslavia. They were sometimes referred to as the "rump Yugoslavia" to distinguish it from the former, larger Yugoslavia. The third war within the former Yugoslavia began in Bosnia in the spring of 1992.

1.19. Which was the dominant nation within Bosnia in terms of population?

1.20. Name the second and third most populous nations within Bosnia's borders.

1.21. Which, if any, of these two minority nations in Bosnia were irredenta of other states?*

1.22. After Bosnia established its independence, would it have been best described as a state, a nation, or a nation-state?*

1.23. Why would the breakup of Bosnia worsen the refugee problem?

1.24. What message would the permanent breakup of Bosnia into two or three separate states send to other ethnic groups in the Balkans and around the world?

1.25. Why wouldn't the Serb-dominated part of Bosnia, which the Bosnian Serbs call *Republika Srpska*, be a viable independent state?

E. Kosovo and Ethnic Cleansing (1999)

Refer to articles by U.S. State Department, Karaosmanoğlu, and Goodrich, Figures 13.7 and 13.8, Table 13.1, and the author's update.

1.26. In what state is Kosovo? _____

1.27. What two nations cohabit Kosovo? _____ and _____

1.28. What nation is the majority in Kosovo? _____

1.29. What state's citizens would likely have irredentist feelings toward Kosovo?*

1.30. What is the aim of "ethnic cleansing"?

1.31. Name five methods of ethnic cleansing. _____

F. All's Not Quiet on the Balkan Front*Refer to Update by authors and Figure 13.8.*

1.32. Is there still a state called Yugoslavia? _____

If not, what is it called now? _____

1.33. Aside from the smoldering conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, what other political geographic issues remain that might break up an existing state and create a new state in the region?

► **ACTIVITY 1 READINGS**► **THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR****Old Animosities, Exploited Today, Underlie Complex Balkans Puzzle³**

by Lawrence J. Goodrich, staff writer of *The Christian Science Monitor*.
 October 13, 1993. Reprinted by permission.

Boston—As the likelihood grows that American forces will be directly involved in trying to restore the peace in the former Yugoslavia, many Americans are asking how the slaughter there began.

Unfortunately, what is happening today in the Balkans is nothing new. It is the continuation of the ethnic and religious hatreds that have swept the region for centuries, made worse by radical nationalists' cynical exploitation of these animosities.

The ethnic mixture of the Balkans began to form about the 5th century A.D. Vast tribal migrations swept across Europe: Germanic tribes came west, followed by Slavs to their east. In succeeding centuries Magyars (Hungarians), Mongols, Tatars, and Bulgars ranged over the Balkans. Between Western and Eastern Europe, a great gulf developed. Rome had fallen, but the Roman Empire in the East, with its capital at Constantinople (Byzantium), lasted another 1,000 years. The Roman church without a state and the Byzantine church subservient to the emperor split over long-standing political and theological disputes. This chasm went right through the Balkans: Hungarians, Slovenes, and Croats were Roman Catholic, while Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs were Eastern Orthodox [see Figure 13.6a].

³Adapted by the authors.

All across Europe nation-states began to form around the most powerful tribes. But in the 14th and 15th centuries, a series of catastrophes struck the Balkans. First the Ottoman Turks defeated Serbia at the battle of Kosovo in 1389. Constantinople (now Istanbul) fell in 1453. [The Ottoman Turks introduced the Muslim (i.e., Islamic) religion into the region.] By 1529 the Turks had fought their way to the gates of Vienna, which they besieged again in 1683 [see Figure 13.6b]. All political, cultural, and economic evolution in those parts of the Balkans under Turkish rule stopped under the oppression of the Turkish sultan.

For the next 400 years, the history of the Balkans was a history of rivalry among the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. Croats, Slovenes, and Transylvanian Romanians lived under the influence of Vienna and Budapest [see Figure 13.6c]. Romanians, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Serbs, and some Albanians clung tenaciously to their Eastern Orthodox faith, which became entwined with their national aspirations. Most Albanians and some Slavs, however, converted to Islam.

The Balkan peasantry was kept impoverished as agricultural riches were shipped off to feed the Ottoman Empire. The Turks played off tribes, clans, and families against each other, poisoning the political culture.

Christianity was barely tolerated.

None of the subsequent development of Western and Central Europe—the growth of guilds and the middle class, the decline of feudalism, the Reformation and the Counterreformation, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment—touched the Balkans.

By the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was in serious decline. Most of the Balkan ethnic groups began to agitate for independence and their own states. But their villages were often scattered among each other.

Little by little each group threw off Turkish rule. Russia felt a special calling to help its Orthodox Slav brethren, the Serbs and Bulgarians, and provided political or military support.


But the rule of the Balkans is: Everything for my ethnic group and nothing for yours. The group on top now governs at the expense of the others; the groups out of power wreak vengeance when the power balance shifts. People see themselves as Serbs, Croatians, or Albanians first and as individuals second.

This attitude is preserved by the region's economic backwardness and low educational levels. It is especially true in rural areas. While cities may be ethnically mixed, villages usually are ethnically pure, or nearly so.


[In 1908, Austria-Hungary directly annexed Bosnia, inciting the Serbs to seek the aid of Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece in seizing the last Ottoman-ruled lands in Europe. In the ensuing Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, Serbia obtained northern and central Macedonia, but Austria compelled it to yield Albanian lands that would have given Austria access to the sea. Serb animosity against Austria-Hungary reached a climax on June 28, 1914, when the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo by a Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip—the spark that lit the powder keg of World War I.⁴]

After the Turkish and Austrian Empires collapsed at the end of World War I, the victorious Allies carved up the remains into a series of new, artificial Balkan states. The southern Slav groups were lumped together in what officially was christened Yugoslavia


⁴U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs. 1999. *Background Notes: Serbia and Montenegro*: www.state.gov/www/background_notes/serbia_9908_bgn.html (August 1999).



a. The Roman Empire adopted Christianity in the fourth century, and split administration between a western half centered on Rome, and an eastern half whose capital was Constantinople (now Istanbul, Turkey). The western half became predominantly Catholic, the eastern half predominantly Orthodox. This divide still runs through the former Yugoslavia: Slovenes and Croats are mostly Catholic, while Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins are mostly Orthodox.



b. Islam originated in Mecca in current-day Saudi Arabia, but soon spread to include what is now Turkey. Centuries later, the Ottoman Empire arose in Turkey and spread Islam well into the Balkans and Europe. Current-day Bosnian Muslims are mostly Slavs who converted to Islam during the long reign of the Ottomans.



c. The outside power that controlled most of the Balkans on the eve of World War I was the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In fact, World War I was triggered when a Bosnian Serb, irate over the latest chapter of outside domination, assassinated the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.

Figure 13.6 Three major empires that divided the Slavic-speaking peoples in the Balkans.

[literally “land of the southern Slavs”] in 1918. Serbia was the dominant partner, which led to constant friction with the Croats. The new country never had a chance. Nazi Germany invaded in 1941 and set up a fascist Croatian puppet state. [The Croatian] Ustashe troops committed terrible atrocities against Bosnian and Croatian Serbs [murdering approximately 350,000 Serbs]. Serbian nationalist guerrillas, the Chetniks, retaliated in kind.

Communist partisans under Josip Broz Tito, armed by the Allies, fought the Germans to a standstill, broke with the Chetniks, and took power at the end of the war. [Post-World War II Yugoslavia had the same external boundaries as before, but internally it was divided into six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro (Figure 13.7a). There was some attempt to define these republics along ethnonational lines, but of the six, only Slovenia was even close to being ethnically pure; see Table 13.1 and Figure 13.8.] Communist rule under Marshal Tito kept a tight lid on ethnic feuding, but it continued to smolder. [Under communist rule, Serbia was transformed from an agrarian to an industrial society.] When Tito died in 1980, he left in place a collective presidency of Yugoslavia that rotated among the six republics.




Figure 13.7 (a) Pre-breakup Yugoslavia; (b) Post-breakup Yugoslavia.




Figure 13.8 Prewar ethnic distribution in the former Yugoslavia.

TABLE 13.1 Percentages of Prewar Ethnic Populations, by Republic or Autonomous Region

	Albanians	Croats	Muslims	Serbs	Slovenes	Others
Bosnia		18	40	33		9
Croatia		75	12			13
Kosovo	90			10		
Macedonia	23			2		67 Macedonians 8 Others
Montenegro	7	1	15	9		68 Montenegrins
Serbia	20	2		65		13
Slovenia		3		2	90	5
Vojvodina				56		21 Hungarians 23 Others
Former Yugoslavia (all republics)	14	20	9	36	8	13

Sources: James Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," *Survival* 33:293 (1991); *Encyclopedia Britannica*; *CIA Factbook*; and PC-Globe software (1989).

But without Tito's personal magnetism and willingness to use force, the system soon began to break down. After communism collapsed in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav federation began to dissolve as Croats and Slovenes demanded independence, partly in pursuit of historic aspirations but also in fear of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's repression of the Albanian minority in Kosovo. Mr. Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman made things worse by their inflammatory rhetoric and their policies of grabbing land from neighboring republics, to create a greater Serbia and a greater Croatia, and to expel other groups. [By the time the fighting died down, Yugoslavia had broken into five new states.] (Figure 13.7b.)

The region remains a tinder box: Greeks are nervous about the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia; Montenegrins, still united with Serbia in rump Yugoslavia, are growing restless; and serious tensions persist between Hungarians and Romanians.

The most dangerous area is Kosovo province in Serbia. An historical Serbian heartland, it is now inhabited mostly by ethnic Albanians, who have seen their rights suppressed by the Milosevic government. Almost half the Albanians in the world live in Serbia; should the Serbs start an ethnic-cleansing campaign, it is doubtful Albania could stand by. Such a conflict could ignite tensions between Greece, which likely would side with the Orthodox Serbs, and Turkey, which would support the Muslim Slavs and mostly Muslim Albanians.

The question now is whether the US can provide the leadership that will take the Balkans in the direction of peace or whether the region will sink deeper into disaster.

► THE UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

UNIDIR/93/37, Research Paper No. 22, 1993. Reprinted by permission.

Excerpted from "Crisis in the Balkans"

by Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu

The 19th and 20th centuries have undoubtedly left scars that are difficult to cure. But the immediate cause of the present Yugoslav crisis is neither external power

intervention nor traditional ethnic animosities. The latter could well be prevented from escalating to a bloody conflict situation if moderate policies were adopted by the conflicting regional entities. First of all, Serbia's, and its extreme nationalist leader Milosevic's, ambition to create a "Greater Serbia" constitute the major cause of the crisis.^[5] To some extent, the crisis is also the product of the Croatian and Bosnian policies of independence which failed to show sufficient consideration for the large Serbian communities in both countries.

Yugoslavia's nations had "very different and often mutually exclusive needs and aspirations." For the Serbs [who were the dominant power], Yugoslavia's future depended on further and tighter centralization. The non-Serb majorities, on the contrary, were in favor of creating their own sovereign states, or at least a confederation of sovereign states. . . .

A series of events in 1990–91 contributed to the deterioration of the crisis. In April 1990, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Democratic United Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS) came to power as a result of multi-party elections. Both political parties were centre-right and pro-independence. During the election campaign, the HDZ advocated a "Greater Croatia" that would annex Croat-populated regions of Bosnia while condemning "greater Serbian hegemony" [i.e., dominance]. This created considerable concern among the Serbian population living in the border areas of Croatia. The Serbian perception of this threat was reinforced, on the one hand, by the increasingly secessionist stance of Croatia, and on the other, by the expulsion of Serbs from government positions. Moreover, the Croatian authorities threatened the Serbs by saying they would take measures to weaken Serbian economic position in the republic. These moves of the Croatian government led to growing Serbian fears, and, eventually, to insurrections and armed clashes. . . .

In February, [Serbian President] Milosevic and [Croatian President] Tudjman agreed on Serbian and Croatian annexations in Bosnia. . . . [A Bosnian referendum on independence] was held in March 1992 without Serbian participation. The Muslims and Croats voted in favor of a "sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina" while the Serbs were erecting barricades around Sarajevo.

So far there have been three wars in the Yugoslav succession. The first took place in Slovenia in the Spring of 1991 and lasted for 10 days. The Serbian minority in Slovenia is only 2.4% of the population and is not implicated in the Serbian design of creating a "Greater Serbia." The conflict remained local without regional or international implications. The second war [between Croats and Serbs from Croatia and Serbia] started in Croatia in the spring of 1991. The hostilities were resumed again in February 1993 while the UN and EC representatives were working on a peace plan. The third began in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the spring of 1992 and is still being waged.

The last two conflicts had a significant similarity. One of their common features was the application by the Serbs of policies of "ethnic cleansing." This involved changing the demographic composition of villages, towns, and regions and clearing land

[⁵As Roskin and Berry (1997) point out: "It's easy to blame the Serbs, but understand where they are coming from psychologically. The Serbs argue: 'All right, you bastards who murdered us during World War II, if you want an independent Croatia and Bosnia, we have the right to pull the Serb areas out of your republics and gather them into a Greater Serbia, where they will be safe.' The attitude of Serbs closely parallels that of Israelis: 'We have historically been the victim of massacres, and we aren't going to take it anymore.'" In fact, there's plenty of blame to go around in Yugoslavia.]

corridors to link up ethnic Serbian enclaves in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia. These policies were (and still are) extensively applied to Bosnian Muslims and Croats. The victims were either directly driven out or intimidated to flee their homes. The methods of intimidation included murder, rape, and imprisonment in concentration camps. The Yugoslav conflict brought more than two million refugees and displaced persons. Countries such as Croatia, Austria, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, and Turkey were put under migratory pressure. Serbia resettled ethnic Serbs in areas that were ethnically cleansed, thereby using refugees to change the demographic composition of regions and thus contributing to the creation of a Greater Serbia. . . .

The Kosovo problem constitutes one of the most dangerous crisis areas in Yugoslavia's ongoing process of disintegration. The origins of this problem can be traced back to the creation of an independent Albanian state after the defeat of Turkey in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. The independent Albania included only 50 percent of the Albanian population in the area. A great number of Albanians remained in Kosovo, an Ottoman province, most of which was given to Serbia. Today there are more than 2 million Albanians in Kosovo (an overwhelming majority of them are Muslims; the figure includes 15,000 Turks) and they account for over 90 percent of the population, the remaining 10 percent being Serbian and Montenegrin. However, the Serbs regard Kosovo as their historic heartland. Kosovo was the cradle of the medieval Serbian state. [See Figure 13.9.] It is the historic battlefield where the Serbs fought against the Ottomans in 1389. It is also a region containing many Orthodox churches and monasteries. These factors make the province a cultural and spiritual centre for the Serbs. Kosovo has greatly contributed to the formation of a Serbian collective memory and consciousness, and this has become particularly significant in the process of building a Serbian state based on ethnic nationalism.

While the Serbs view Kosovo as a part of the Serbian historical patrimony that cannot be negotiable, the Albanians base their claims on self-determination. Kosovo was in fact a self-governing province of Serbia in terms of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. Kosovo had its semi-autonomous status gradually eroded by the central government in Belgrade in 1990–1991. The basic cultural and educational rights of the Albanian population were abrogated. The Serbian authorities shut down the Albanian language schools. They dismissed Albanians from the police force, which has been totally serbianized. Belgrade also reinforced the local security force by sending in Serbian and Montenegrin military units. Moreover, the economy was almost entirely serbianized. Most of the Albanian workers and managers were replaced with the Serbs.

The Albanians, for their part, took measures to set up their own state organization in a gradual and clandestine manner. In September 1991 they held a referendum in which they voted for a "sovereign and independent" Kosovo. In May 1992 they held elections [and elected the moderate intellectual Ibrahim Rugova]. They also set up an underground school system financed by parents. Despite these efforts, the Kosovars have not been able to develop an effective means to defend themselves should the fighting spread to Kosovo. The lack of adequate defensive means, on the one hand, and the offensive Serbian strategy on the other, have brought about a very deep sense of insecurity, not only in Kosovo but also in Albania. It should be noted that this feeling of insecurity, combined with the measures of democratization in Albania and Kosovo, increased the assertiveness of Albanians. As a matter of fact, the democratic elections in both countries have further increased popular pressure for an Albanian-Kosovar reunion.




Figure 13.9 Former borders of Serbia.

Nevertheless, in spite of popular pressure, Albanian authorities in both countries prevented numerous incidents from escalating to all-out conflict. [Remember that this was published in 1993.] Moreover, many Albanians seem willing to accept some form of autonomy within a new Yugoslavia. But this type of settlement is abhorred by the Milosevic administration which still views Kosovo as an integral part of a unitary Serbia.

The Albanians are careful not to provide the Serbian authorities with an excuse for a violent crackdown and the Albanian government has been urging the Kosovars to contribute to a peaceful solution of the Kosovo problem. But Albanian leaders have repeatedly declared that ethnic cleansing in Kosovo would not be tolerated by Tirana [Albania's capital] and would lead to Albania's military intervention.

► *THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR*

February 17, 1993; Copyright © 1993 Lee Malis/Spectrum Pictures. Reprinted by permission.

Bosnia: The Flight from Ethnic Cleansing

by Lee Malis

(photos by Lee Malis)

Travnik, Bosnia-Herzegovina—The war in Bosnia continues. Diplomats still talk about what needs to be done, and how to make it stand once it is agreed upon. But the television news broadcasts say the bombings continue in Sarajevo. Another Bosnian village with a strange name falls to Serbian militias, and another massacre occurs in an unfamiliar place. Muslims try to retake eastern towns, and Serbs block UN attempts to break through with aid.

I have worked in the former Yugoslavia three times over the past two years as a freelance photographer for US magazines. During my first trip to Sarajevo, my guide was killed, a young Spanish photographer I had become friends with died, and my friend who is an Associated Press photographer was wounded.

Hundreds of other men, women, and children also died in those two or three weeks in Sarajevo.

On my last trip, in late November, I tried to make a portrait of the refugees in Travnik, a small city in the mountains of Bosnia 60 miles northwest of Sarajevo. I spent nine days living in a refugee camp there.

These were average Muslim Bosnians. They were not diplomats or generals or politicians. They were moms and dads, electricians and farmers, and children. Their names cannot be used because they have left families behind in villages under Serbian control.

There are hundreds of thousands of refugees in Bosnia, primarily because of “ethnic cleansing” by the Serbs. In Travnik and surrounding communities 20,000 to 30,000 refugees are scattered in homes, schools, and sports halls.

When the Serbs take an area, they “cleanse” cities and towns of non-Serbs, who make up about two-thirds of the Bosnian population. Just over half are Muslims, and the rest are Croats. Those “cleansed” are either killed, sent to refugee camps or prison camps, or more often just told to leave or they will be killed. The Muslim population is taking the worst of the atrocities.



Since the war began last year [1992], Serbian militias have taken control of close to 70 percent of the country. The refugees lose their homes and belongings. When the Muslims reach a refugee camp, they can go no farther. Many European countries have closed their borders, because they say they have no more room for Bosnian refugees.

Four People Managed to Escape Through the Window

High in the mountains, in a quiet village nine miles from Travnik, are a few remnants of a family from the town of Visegrad, in eastern Bosnia. They are staying in the home of a family they have never met before, just one of thousands of families living in strangers' homes.

I was led there by a 10-year-old boy from a nearby town who spoke little English. The boy told me that I should talk with this family of refugees, because there is a survivor of a massacre there.

The family invites me into their one room. The atmosphere is brittle, as if the world is made of eggshells. The first thing they do is make coffee for everyone. It seems that if Bosnian Muslims have absolutely nothing, they will always manage to make coffee for guests.

The family consists of a woman, her child, and her parents.



In the spring of last year, the woman says, Visegrad had been taken over by Serbs. On the morning of June 13, she talked with a good friend of hers who is Serbian. The friend told her that she should get out of town as fast as possible, and try to go to another village that was safer.

When she returned home from visiting her friend, it was already too late. The Serbs were rounding up the men and taking them away. Young women were being taken to “rape hotels” for the soldiers.

The people who remained were told to leave at gunpoint. From her neighborhood, there was a group of 64 old men, women, and children. One baby girl was only two days old. They got as far as the Drina River, still in the city of Visegrad. They were stopped on the bridge that leads out of town.

There they were searched for money, jewelry, and anything else of value, and it was stolen from them. They stood on the bridge for two hours. During that time, the woman saw about 10 bodies either floating in the river or lying along its banks.

The five soldiers holding them on the bridge were all familiar to her. She had grown up with some of them and knew some of their families.

The 64 Muslims were led into a house and forced into one room. The soldiers made them take off their clothes, and their clothes were taken away.

The people waited in the room for a short time, and then the door was opened and someone threw in a bomb. It was not a regular bomb, but something that burned. In the madness, people tried to escape through the window. Then the commander came in with a machine gun and opened fire. Four people managed to escape through the window; the other 60 were killed, including her mother-in-law, with whom she lived. She herself was shot twice, once in the arm and once in the leg.

Of the people who died, she knew the names and families of 26 women, nine elderly men, and 19 children. The oldest was a 93-year-old man, and the youngest was the two-day-old baby girl.

She could not keep up with the other three who had escaped. There was a woman, the woman's son, and an elderly man. But she could only get a short distance away, where she found a sewer and crawled inside. She lay there for three days.

A Muslim woman who was still in Visegrad found her, after the other survivors said where they had last seen her. The woman administered some minor first aid, gave her food, and contacted her mother and father, who had also heard that their daughter was still alive.

They managed to come to her. In the evening, they had to crawl and walk, carrying her for more than a mile along sewage ditches to avoid being seen. Then they walked and hitchhiked 30 miles to the Muslim-held town of Gorazde, where she stayed in the hospital 22 days.

As soon as she was well enough, she was let out of the hospital to make room for others. Gorazde was under siege at the time, and the city was being bombed.

She, her son, and her parents again walked and hitchhiked through dangerous territory for five days until they reached Zenica.

During the whole interview, the mother had not said a word. She sat quietly, listening to the story, distractedly serving coffee now and then, but mostly looking down or out the window. The tears were in her eyes as the interview ended, and she was embarrassed for crying. She told the ten-year-old guide that four of her sons also have disappeared. There has been no word from them in six months.

They Have to Leave the Men Behind

A young woman says goodbye to her brother and father as she gets into a car. Her mother, sister, and a younger brother are going with her. They have to leave the men behind at the refugee center in Travnik. If the men were caught traveling, they would be put into the Bosnian Army or imprisoned by the Serbs. The family's visa is forged, but they are going to try to get out of Bosnia anyway. The women say they are afraid they will never see the older brother and father again.



► **THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR**

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Keeping Bosnia Whole: Why the World Cares—Five Reasons International Officials Aim for United State

by Laura Kay Rozen, special to *The Christian Science Monitor*

Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina—The international officials charged with keeping Bosnia together as a multi-ethnic state liken their task to building a house of cards—one they can only hope will get stronger with time. In the meantime, they say, only one thing will continue to be the cement holding the country together: international will.

Although last weekend's elections bolstered the power of nationalists who would split the country apart, the mediators charged with implementing the Dayton peace accords—the blueprint for peace—are now gearing up to overcome the obstacles to a united Bosnia.

But why all the effort? The cost of ethnic partition and secession, they say, would be too high for the West, as well as for the Balkans.

Specifically, there are five reasons driving the international community's efforts:

Bosnian Serb Independence Won't Work

Contrary to the nationalist aims of the Bosnian Serbs, independence of their entity, so-called Republika Srpska, is not viable, analysts say. "There is simply no real future for that little jagged piece of territory if it is not integrated into [Bosnia]," said U.S. Balkans envoy, Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum. "It is not a place that can secede and survive."

The dividing line between the Bosnian Serb area and Muslim-Croat Federation agreed to at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, last November was never meant to be an international border. It is a zig-zagging and impractical line that would impede economic and political development for both sides, as well as be militarily indefensible.

"The boundaries between the Serb and Muslim-Croat parts of Bosnia are meant to be fluid," explains Ambassador Michael Steiner, deputy to UN mediator Carl Bildt.

"Besides, the Republika Srpska has nowhere to secede into. [Serbian President Slobodan] Milosevic is not going to risk international ostracization and sanctions to support a secessionist Bosnian Serb state."

A Muslim State in Europe

U.S. and European officials are particularly concerned that a Muslim minstate—what would remain if Bosnia's Croats and Serbs secede—would be manipulated by radical Islamic countries. "Europe would have a very serious problem. Radical forces are just waiting for this to happen. You would have a Gaza Strip situation here," said Steiner, referring to the area the Israelis charge is a terrorist hotbed.

"At the [Muslim-led Party for Democratic Action] SDA rally at Kosovo stadium last week, there were 70,000 people. At the left and right of the crowd, there were the radicals, shouting in Farsi," explains Steiner. "The radical fringe of SDA is still a minority. But if things go the wrong way, they will be hardened. These radical forces will become dominant." It's not what the SDA wants, he says, "but they will be used." [Authors' note: This argument represents a prejudiced point of view that automatically associates countries with Islamic majorities with radical Islamic terrorism. Nevertheless, the reporter is correctly reporting it as a concern that was voiced.]

Regional Example. Diplomats say that international sanction of Serb secession would send a message to other ethnic groups in the region that aggression and genocide are acceptable ways to achieve their territorial and national goals.

“Look, 200,000 people were killed in this war, 3 million people were forced from their homes, many by ethnic cleansing, men and women were raped, tortured, starved, and slaughtered in Europe’s first death camps since World War II. For them to let the Bosnian Serbs who sanctioned this behavior get their own state is morally despicable,” says a UN official.

U.S. Envoy Richard Holbrooke also makes a moral case for why Serb secession cannot be tolerated. “No one objected to the ‘Velvet Divorce’ of Czechoslovakia. It was done in a democratic way. . . . But what happened here is aggression. Because of the nature of the process that unfolded here, it would not have been appropriate to sanction secession or partition.”

Analysts say that many areas in the Balkans share conditions that led to ethnic conflict in Bosnia. The Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, the Muslims in Sandzak share the problems of ethnic minorities in undemocratic states that offer minorities few rights and security, and have equally devastated economies. These minorities and their governments are watching Bosnia closely.

Refugees. Secession would mean refugees would never be able to return to their homes which are now held by other ethnic groups, and would therefore remain a source of political and economic tension. Steiner points out that over half of Bosnia’s pre-war population—3 million people—has been displaced by the war, and are now living as refugees abroad or in refugee housing in other parts of Bosnia. The majority of refugees in Europe are Muslims who were ethnically cleansed from areas now controlled by Serbs.

Bosnian refugees are creating economic and social burdens in Croatia and Europe. Germany in particular—which has taken in more refugees than any other Western European country—has an interest in sending its 300,000 Bosnian refugees home.

“I don’t think we will ever get stabilization without allowing those refugees who want to go back,” says Steiner.

NATO Credibility

Analysts here are concerned that the failure to follow the multiethnic vision of the Dayton accord would devastate the organizations that have been sent here to implement the peace. NATO and U.S. leadership in the Bosnia peace effort would have failed to bring a permanent solution to Europe’s worst conflict since World War II.

A breakdown of the multiethnic government would likely require a long-term engagement of NATO forces in Bosnia and would place these forces in a more dangerous situation.

Officials say that international will to end a new Bosnian war after the huge effort to implement Dayton would be exhausted. They also say that renewed fighting would seriously damage the credibility of the NATO alliance, whose first active engagement was to send 60,000 forces to enforce the Bosnia peace.

► **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE****From "Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo"**

Report released by the U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 1999

What began in late February 1998 as a Serb government campaign against the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has evolved into a comprehensive, pre-meditated, and systematic program to ethnically cleanse the Serbian province of Kosovo of its roughly 1.7 million ethnic Albanian residents (also referred to as Kosovar Albanians). Because Serbian authorities have denied access to international monitors, documentation efforts have been too fragmented to estimate definitively the number of missing and dead. . . .

The term "ethnic cleansing" first came into use during the mass expulsions of ethnic Muslims from towns in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992; since then, media outlets, human rights groups and governments have used it on enough occasions to require careful definition. As used in this report, ethnic cleansing is defined as the systematic and forced removal of the members of an ethnic group from a community or communities in order to change the ethnic composition of a given region. In Bosnia, many ethnically cleansed towns and regions were eventually reoccupied by members of another ethnic group (who themselves often had been cleansed).

From the beginning, the [Serbian] regime in Belgrade has deliberately misled the international community and its own people about its ethnic cleansing campaign. Counterinsurgency operations against the KLA began in late February and early March 1998, when Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs Police (MUP) attacked the villages of Likosane and Cirez. These attacks resulted in the death of 25 Kosovar Albanians, of which as many as 14 may have been summarily executed. . . .

In late March 1999, Serbian forces dramatically increased the scope and pace of their efforts, moving away from selective targeting of towns and regions suspected of KLA sympathies toward a sustained and systematic effort to ethnically cleanse the entire province of Kosovo. To date, Serb forces conducting ethnic cleansing operations have not yet tried to repopulate the over 500 towns and villages from which residents have been evicted. Some villages are now used as cover for Serb military emplacements. Many, however, remain depopulated. NATO is committed to ensuring the return of all Kosovars to their homes.

Since March 19, 1999, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over 700,000 Kosovars have fled to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (211,000), Albania (404,000), Bosnia-Herzegovina (17,000), the Republic of Montenegro (62,000), and elsewhere (as of May 5, 1999). [See Figure 13.10.] The Governments of Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, and Montenegro have provided land for camps, logistical support, and protection. NATO forces in Macedonia and Albania have helped establish transit camps. Other governments have begun to accept varying numbers of refugees to ease the pressure on the so-called "front-line" states. Even with such support, however, the front-line states will continue to bear the brunt of these mass expulsions, which has badly burdened the economies and upset the political balances of these states.

Although the media has focused almost exclusively on the story of the hundreds of thousands of exhausted refugees arriving at camps in Macedonia and Albania, another story has escaped their attention, in large part because Serbian authorities have not permitted entry into Kosovo. Those left behind in Kosovo—known as internally displaced persons, or IDPs—suffer under much worse conditions than even those faced by refugees. While independent sources have not been able to confirm




Figure 13.10 Serb attacks in Kosovo and refugee flows from Kosovo.

Source: U.S. State Department, www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/map1.html.

reports of starvation among IDPs in Kosovo, many in all likelihood are experiencing food shortages, malnutrition, health problems, and other types of deprivation as a result of having to hide from Serbian forces for weeks in neighboring mountains and forests. Needless to say, they also likely face attack by Serbian forces. According to some reports, VJ [Yugoslav Army] units have thrown grenades from helicopters at fleeing IDPs. Shelling of civilians reportedly has been used to herd groups of refugees for later deportation.

From "Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting (Executive Summary)"

Report released by the U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., December 1999

"Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting" is a new chapter in our effort to document the extent of human rights and humanitarian law violations in Kosovo, and to convey the size and scope of the Kosovo conflict. The information in this report is drawn from refugee accounts, NGO [nongovernmental organizations] documentation, press accounts, and declassified information from government and international organization sources.

The atrocities against Kosovar Albanians documented in this report occurred primarily between March and late June, 1999.

A central question is the number of Kosovar Albanian victims of Serbian forces in Kosovo. Many bodies were found when KFOR [U.N. Kosovo Peacekeeping Force] and the ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia] entered Kosovo in June 1999. The evidence is also now clear that Serbian forces conducted a systematic campaign to burn or destroy bodies, or to bury the bodies, then rebury them to conceal evidence of Serbian crimes. On June 4, at the end of the conflict, the Department of State issued the last of a series of weekly ethnic cleansing reports, available at www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_990604_ksvo_ethnic.html, concluding that at least 6,000 Kosovar Albanians were victims of mass murder, with an unknown number of victims of individual killings, and an unknown number of bodies burned or destroyed by Serbian forces throughout the conflict.

The Prosecutor said her office had exhumed 2,108 bodies from 195 of the 529 known mass graves. . . . Enough evidence has emerged to conclude that probably around 10,000 Kosovar Albanians were killed by Serbian forces [see Figure 13.11].




Figure 13.11 Before and after aerial photography evidence of mass graves.

Source: www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnic_ksvo_7a.html.

Death represents only one facet of Serbian actions in Kosovo. Over 1.5 million Kosovar Albanians—at least 90 percent of the estimated 1998 Kosovar Albanian population of Kosovo—were forcibly expelled from their homes. Tens of thousands of homes in at least 1,200 cities, towns, and villages have been damaged or destroyed. During the conflict, Serbian forces and paramilitaries implemented a systematic campaign to ethnically cleanse Kosovo—aspects of this campaign include the following:

- *Forcible Displacement of Kosovar Albanian Civilians:* Serbian authorities conducted a campaign of forced population movement. In contrast to actions taken during 1998, Yugoslav Army units and armed civilians joined the police in systematically expelling Kosovar Albanians at gunpoint from both villages and larger towns in Kosovo.
- *Looting of Homes and Businesses:* There are numerous reports of Serbian forces robbing residents before burning their homes. Another round of robbery occurred as Serbian forces stole from fleeing Kosovars as they crossed the border to Montenegro, Albania, or Macedonia.
- *Widespread Burning of Homes:* Over 1,200 residential areas were at least partially burned after late March, 1999. Kosovar Albanians have reported that over 500 villages were burned after March, 1999.
- *Use of Human Shields:* Refugees claim that Serbian forces used Kosovar Albanians to escort military convoys and shield facilities throughout the province. Other reporting indicates that Serbian forces intentionally positioned ethnic Albanians at sites they believed were targets for NATO airstrikes.

- *Detentions:* Serbian forces systematically separated military-aged men from the general population as Kosovars were expelled. These men were detained in facilities ranging from cement factories to prisons. Many of these detainees were forced to dig trenches and were physically abused. At least 2,000 Kosovar Albanians remain in detention in around a dozen Serbian prisons today.
- *Summary Executions:* There are accounts of summary executions at about 500 sites across Kosovo.
- *Exhumation of Mass Graves:* Serbian forces burned, destroyed, or exhumed bodies from mass graves in an attempt to destroy evidence. Some were reinterred in individual graves.
- *Rape:* There are numerous accounts indicating that the organized and individual rape of Kosovar Albanian women by Serbian forces was widespread. For example, Serbian forces systematically raped women in Djakovica and Pec, and in some cases rounded up women and took them to hotels where they were raped by troops under encouragement of their commanders. Rape is most likely an underreported atrocity because of the stigma attached to the victims in traditional Kosovar Albanian society.
- *Violations of Medical Neutrality:* Kosovar Albanian physicians, patients and medical facilities were systematically attacked. Many health care facilities were used as protective cover for military activities; NGOs report the destruction by Serbian forces of at least 100 clinics, pharmacies, and hospitals.
- *Identity Cleansing:* Kosovar Albanians were systematically stripped of identity and property documents including passports, land titles, automobile license plates, identity cards, and other forms of documentation. As much as 50 percent of the population may be without documentation. By systematically destroying schools, places of worship, and hospitals, Serbian forces sought to destroy social identity and the fabric of Kosovar Albanian society.
- *Aftermath:* Following the withdrawal of Serbian forces in June, Kosovo saw manifestations of a new set of human rights problems. These include acts of retribution against the Serb minority, including the killing of 200–400 Serb residents. In addition, as many as 23,000 conscientious objectors, draft evaders, and deserters in Serbia are threatened with legal action.

► BY THE AUTHORS

Update on the Former Yugoslavia to 2005

Bosnia

The fighting in Bosnia described in these readings was not easily brought to a halt. As definitive evidence of genocide mounted, the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) finally moved to stop the bloodshed. A “no flight” zone was declared over Bosnia, and international economic sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia. Eventually, the ban on weapons imports into Bosnia—originally designed to douse the fire—was lifted to enable the Muslims to defend themselves. The Bosnian Muslims then joined forces with the Croats to mount a counteroffensive against Serbian strongholds. The Croats successfully regained control of the Serb-populated regions

of Croatia, and the Muslims succeeded in reestablishing some territorial corridors between their safe havens.

Finally, an on-again, off-again cease-fire was reached, and UN peacekeeping forces from a variety of countries, including the United States and Canada, moved in. Bosnian Serbs at that time controlled about 70 percent of Bosnia, with the Muslim-Croat alliance controlling the rest. As the economic embargo began causing real hardship, Yugoslavia's President Milosevic pressured the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table. In 1995, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher brokered a peace deal known as the *Dayton Accords* that all parties reluctantly accepted. Bosnia was to remain a multi-nation state but was divided into two autonomous parts. The Bosnian Serbs received 49 percent of the territory, which they renamed *Republika Srpska*, with 51 percent for the still-combined Muslim-Croat Federation (see Figure 13.12). Notice how the boundaries were designed to make each group's territory a contiguous whole, even if it means having a narrow corridor as a connector. This way, there is free unrestricted movement within each ethnic republic and one less excuse to restart the war.

In the Muslim-Croat Federation, the predominantly Croatian area of Bosnia known as *Herceg-Bosna* had evolved into a ministate of sorts, with stronger ties to Zagreb than to Sarajevo. While all three nations have some "multiculturalists" who favor a unified Bosnia and nationalists who favor separatism or irredentism, a July 1996 poll found that 95 percent of Bosnian Serbs and two-thirds of Bosnian Croats opposed a unified country. Only Muslims favored keeping Bosnia whole. The U.S. Department of State's policy was that, unless indicted war criminals are brought to justice, per the Dayton Accords, the festering rivalries that produced the war in the first place would prevent a lasting peace. Some European governments, however, argued that punishing the Serbs would be counterproductive because it is more important to rebuild Bosnia economically. Then, when the peacekeeping troops do pull out, there will be a functioning economy so that all three ethnic groups will have a stake in preserving the peace. The United States has poured billions of




Figure 13.12 Bosnia-Herzegovina after the 1995 Dayton peace accords.

dollars into Bosnia to help with reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and military reconstruction. European Union Forces (EUFOR) took over peacekeeping duties from NATO in December 2004.

Kosovo

The United States and its European allies bear some responsibility for the Kosovo crisis. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was a small fringe organization with little popular support for armed insurrection in Kosovo until after the Dayton peace conference. The conference excluded any Kosovar Albanian delegates, and many Albanians concluded that “the reward for nonviolence was international neglect” (Hooper, 1999).⁶ When increased Albanian unrest led to a Serbian crackdown in 1998, the U.S. unwillingness to follow through on its threats of air strikes against Yugoslavian military targets emboldened the Serbs and helped convince the Albanians to take matters into their own hands. International attempts to broker a peace settlement in February 1999 failed dismally, as Yugoslavian military, police, and paramilitary units amassed within and around Kosovo.

Having learned its lesson in Bosnia, NATO responded to Serbian attacks much faster in Kosovo, although not fast enough to stop the Serbs from ethnically cleansing most Albanians from Kosovo (see U.S. Department of State reports). On March 24, 1999, two weeks after the start of the Serbian offensive, NATO began launching air strikes against Yugoslavian military, police, television, transportation, electricity, and water supply targets. The air war eventually crippled Yugoslavia, and two to three months after the fighting began, Yugoslavia accepted a cease-fire and began to withdraw. Peacekeeping troops have been contributed by 19 NATO members (including the United States, Canada, and almost all of their European allies) as well as 18 non-NATO countries (including Russia, other Slavic former Soviet states such as Ukraine, other Muslim former Soviet states such as Azerbaijan, and Islamic Middle Eastern states such as Jordan). Peacekeeping forces are involved in rebuilding infrastructure and institutions and removing land mines but have been unable to completely prevent Albanians from revenge attacks and ethnic cleansing against the remaining Serbs. An estimated 500 to 1,000 Serbs have been murdered since the Yugoslavian Army pulled out. Many Kosovar Serbs have abandoned their homes and fled to Serbia proper, fueling another chapter in the long annals of Serbian victimhood. As in Bosnia, a *de facto* partition has taken place, with Serbs concentrating in North Mitrovica, an area adjacent to Serbia and home to a vast gold and zinc mining complex.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 calls for preparing Kosovo for “substantial autonomy and self-government.” In interim elections in October 2000, Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) won the majority of seats over two other parties run by former KLA leaders. All three major parties advocated eventual independence for Kosovo. As of early 2005, though technically still part of Serbia, Kosovo continues to be governed by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), as it has been since June 1999.

Macedonia

In March 2001, ethnic violence erupted in Macedonia, one of the six former republics of Yugoslavia. Bordered by Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, Macedonia’s population is 23 percent Albanian (see Figure 13.8, Table 13.1).

⁶Hooper, James. Kosovo: America’s Balkan Problem. *Current History* (April 1999):159–164.

Macedonia had been lauded as the only former Yugoslavian republic that had seceded without bloodshed. Its multinational population was thought to coexist peacefully. Less than two years after the war in Kosovo ended, however, Albanian nationalist fighters and their weapons began crossing the border from Kosovo to attack Slavic Macedonian targets in the mountainous Albanian majority zone. The rebels called for a change in the Macedonian constitution to upgrade the status of the Albanian minority—a change that would essentially partition the country along ethnic lines. Although the situation sounds hauntingly familiar, Macedonia's situation contains some unique elements. When Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991, the neighboring state of Greece refused to recognize its independence until it agreed to change its official name to the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to distinguish it from the Macedonian region of Greece. Greece imposed a trade blockade on Macedonia, which it finally lifted in 1995. Meanwhile, the neighboring state of Bulgaria has questioned whether Macedonians are a nation at all or really an offshoot of the Slavic Bulgarian nation. There is also a small Serbian minority (2 percent) in Macedonia.

Serbia and Montenegro

In one of the most unexpected and dramatic events of the entire saga, the Serbian people succeeded in overthrowing President Slobodan Milosevic, the architect of a decade of ethnic cleansing. The Serbian people, although still strongly nationalistic, had grown tired of war, air raids, poverty, and ostracism from the international community. Average income had dropped to \$40 per month, and the streets of Belgrade had become one large flea market. Elections were held in September 2000, and by all reports the opposition party triumphed, although the government denied it. In early October 2000, after a general strike, massive crowds began gathering in the streets of Belgrade for speeches and protests. On October 5 the crowd stormed the Parliament building, and with Serbian troops unwilling to fire on their own people, the Milosevic era came to a quick, bloodless end.

In new elections on December 24, 2000, moderate reformer Vojislav Kostunica was elected President of Yugoslavia with the promise to complete democratic reforms. Many thorny issues faced the new regime, including international war crime indictments against former Serbian leaders, economic reconstruction, trade relations with other former Yugoslavian republics, and pressure for unification with, and protection of, Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. Yugoslavia was readmitted to the United Nations in 2001.

Meanwhile, the party in Montenegro favoring independence from Yugoslavia and its Serb majority narrowly won national elections in April 2001. Montenegrins, who comprise about two-thirds of the population, share a similar religion and language with the Serbs but historically have developed separately from them (see Figure 13.8, Table 13.1). Prior to the downfall of Milosevic, the United States was encouraging Montenegrins to seek independence as a way of weakening the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia. After Milosevic fell, however, the United States did an about-face and began discouraging them because independence for any new Balkan nation could send a “green light” to the others and precipitate new wars.

In 2002, the Serbian and Montenegrin regions of Yugoslavia began negotiations to forge a looser relationship. These talks became a reality on February 4, 2003, when their parliament restructured the country into a federation of two republics; The new state is now officially called *Serbia and Montenegro*. The two confederate republics

agreed to hold a referendum in each republic in three years on whether to opt for full independence.

That the road to peace and reconstruction is not smooth was made abundantly clear on March 12, 2003, only one month after the new confederation was formed. A sniper killed the prime minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, the charismatic philosopher-politician who rallied the people to oust Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. Former members of the Milosevic regime now involved in organized crime were believed to be behind the assassination. The reform-minded and pro-Western Djindjic had threatened to arrest Gen. Ratko Mladic, who is wanted by the tribunal for war crimes in Bosnia.